George Mason’s views were similar to his fellow Virginias'. His fame as a democrat no doubt owes much to
his
eloquence in
arguing for popular election of the House:
[The House] was to be the grand depository of the
democratic principle of the Govt. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons
– It ought to know & sympathize with every part of different parts of the
whole republic . . . He admitted that we
had been too democratic but was afraid we sd incautiously run into the opposite
extreme. We ought to attend to the
rights of every class of the people.
The people will be represented; they
ought therefore to choose the Representatives.
The requisites in actual representation are that the Rep. Should
sympathize with their constituents; shd think as they think, & feel as they
feel . . . Much he sd had been alledged agst deomocratic elections. . . . But
compare these with the advantage of this Form in favor of the rights of the
people, in favor of human nature.
Although the primary author of the Virginia constitution
whose property restrictions on the vote Jefferson found so undemocratic, Mason
opposed restricting the vote to freeholders,
saying that the vote should go to
anyone with “evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with
Society.” “Does no other kind of
property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor? Does nothing besides property mark a
permanent attachment.”
Like all
Virginians, Mason
championed the western states. He favored representation by population,
saying that it was a good enough measure of wealth for “every substantial
purpose,” which removed any reason for denying full representation to the
Western states because they would not be able to make equal contributions to
the treasury. Since representation was
to be by population and the north had the majority of the population, he would
agree they had the right to preponderate.
But they should not preponderate if they were not longer in the majority. Since it would obviously not be in the
interest of current majority to become the legislative minority, periodic
reapportionment should be required or it would never happen. Mason made it clear that he expected the
South to increase in population faster than the north. His principles, therefore, are certainly
democratic, but there is a certain measure of self-interest to them. As for the western states:
Ought we to sacrifice what we know to be right in itself,
lest it should prove favorable to States
which are not yet in existence. If the
Western States are to be admitted into the Union, as they arise, they must, he
wd repeat, be treated as equals and subjected to no degrading discriminations.
They will have the same pride & other passions which we have, and will
either not unite with us or will speedily revolt from the Union, if they are
not in all respects placed on an equal footing with their brethren.
Mason was not so new democratic on
the issue of qualifications to office.
He was the one who
proposed a minimum age of 25 for the House,
favored requiring seven, rather than three years’ citizenship for
Representatives and fourteen years’ citizenship for Senators,
saying that he would have barred immigrants from the Senate altogether, if so
many immigrants had not distinguished themselves during the Revolution, nor did he see any
reason to make an exception for immigrants
currently naturalized by the states. But more disturbing from today’s perspective
were his
views on property qualifications:
One important object in constituting the Senate was to
secure the rights of property. To give
them weight & firmness for the purpose, a considerable duration in office
was thought necessary. But a longer term
than 6 years, would be of no avail in this respect, if need person should be
appointed. He suggested therefore the
propriety of annexing to the office a qualification of property.
He later
moved for setting qualifications in
landed property for the national
legislature and disqualifying public debtors and persons with unsettled
accounts. As we have
seen, Madison opposed this requirement as unjust to the urban population, and,
we shall see, the altogether undemocratic Gouverneur Morris resisted the ban on
public debtors and persons with unsettled accounts as barring importing all
merchants from office, since merchants regularly posted bond for the tax on the
goods they imported and only gradually paid it off as they sold their
goods. He therefore considered Mason’s
proposed qualifications “a scheme of the landed agst the monied interest.” Morris was probably
right; Mason probably was trying to promote rural over urban interest. He probably did not consider this
undemocratic, be merely a protecting of the majority of farmers against a
merchant aristocracy.
As for old democracy, Mason, like
Randolph, was an old democrat on all issues except length of terms. He favored
doubling the House from 65 members
to 130, considering 65 members to be too small in absolute numbers and too
small to know local interests and have the confidence of the people. Even 130 members was almost too few. He
favored allowing only the House to
originate money bills because only they were “immediate
representatives” of the people, because the Senate’s long terms and small
numbers made it too “aristocratic” and because the Senate represented the
states instead of the people. He also
strongly favored making legislators ineligible to executive office in order to prevent the sort
of corruption so prevalent in England, which
he regarded as creating an aristocracy, sarcastically
commenting that “In the
present state of American morals & manners, few friends it may be thought
will be lost to the plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a mercenary
& depraved ambition.” Mason also feared a standing army. It was he who
first proposed to give the
federal government the authority to regulate the militia in order to strengthen
it and proposed that this section be preceded with the words, “And that the
liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger of standing
armies in time of peace.” He also
called for a bill of rights, although he also
believed that the prohibition on ex post facto laws should apply only to
criminal and not civil cases.
Mason also had an old democrat’s
general distrust of the executive. He
favored election of the executive by the national legislature rather than by
the people, believing that the people would not know enough about eminent
characters outside of their own state and that a designing conspiracy could
control the election.
Indeed, “[I]t would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character
for chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to
a blind man.” He
originally
opposed the creation of a single executive and later came out in favor of a
privy council for the President, chosen by the
Senate, with two members for the New England, two from the Mid Atlantic, and
two from the Southern states. This
counsel, and not the Senate, should assist the President in making
appointment. “[I]n rejecting a Council
to the President we were about to try an experiment on which the most despotic
Governments had never ventured. The
Grand Signor [Turkish sultan] himself had his Divan.” He firmly favored making the
President
impeachable, since no man should be above justice and
believed that “maladministration” or at least “high crimes &
misdemeanors” should be impeachable, as well as bribery or treason. He opposed executive appointment
of
judges as potentially giving the President an improper
influence over the
judiciary, favored legislative appointment
of the
treasurer since money belongs to the people and the legislature, as the
peoples’ representative, should appoint the keepers of it and
opposed allowing the President to pardon
treason. He was of mixed opinions about the executive
veto. Originally he
opposed the
executive veto, especially in the hands of a single executive, fearing the
executive would abuse his veto to extort greater power, until he had the same
influence through appointments as the British monarch and would become, in
effect, a monarch in all but name. On the other hand, he
favored joining the
judiciary with the executive veto to give the executive “confidence” to use his
veto, which he believed should be used not only to prevent legislative
encroachments on executive power, but to strike down bad laws in general. He also
believed that only two-thirds, not three-quarters of the legislature
should be needed to override a veto.
Mason was less old democratic on
length of terms. He
favored a two-year
term for the House, saying that one year was inconvenient for states more
distant from the capital and two years would synchronize with South Carolina’s
electoral cycle. He
did not specify what term he favored for the Senate, but made clear that he
favored the relatively
long (six-year) term, although he thought it made it
dangerous for the Senate to originate money bills. He also favored two, rather than three
Senators from each state to keep the Senate from being too
numerous, and, as we have seen, believed that the Senate should secure property
and should therefore have property requirements for office. He favored a seven-year term
"at least" for
the President with no re-eligibility to ensure his
independence from the
legislature, although he emphatically
opposed an executive for “good behavior” as prelude to a monarchy.
Mason ultimately refused to sign the
Constitution. Unlike Gerry or Randolph,
he did not list his reasons during the Convention. After the Convention, however, he published a
list of his objections that he had apparently written down during the
Convention:
(1) No
bill of rights
(2) Insufficient
representation in the House (although he considered the last-minute change in
ratio of representation from 40,000 to 1 to 30,000 to 1 a significant
improvement)
(3) The
Senate’s power to alter money bills
(4) The
Senate’s role in appointments and other powers he considered executive
(5) The
federal judiciary will tend to absorb all state judiciaries and make law too
remote, tedious and expensive
(6) The
absence of a council for the President
(7) The
Vice President as President of the Senate gives the executive legislative
powers
(8) The
President’s power to pardon treason
(9) Making
treaties supreme law of the land without requiring concurrence of the House
(10) Permitting
commercial regulations by a simple majority
(11) The
power of Congress to make all laws “necessary and proper”
(12) No
protection for freedom of the press or against standing armies
(13) States may not tax their own exports
(14) Protection
of slave importation
(15) Prohibition
on ex post facto laws applies to civil as well as criminal laws.
As with Edmund
Randolph, some of these objections are to the extent of federal powers, some
are attempts to uphold Virginia’s specific interests, and some are old
democratic. Like Randolph, he did not
object to the Constitution on new democratic grounds.