Much the same
can be said of Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut. Ellsworth was, with Dickinson, one of the
leading advocates of the Great Compromise. Like Dickinson, he combined elements of old democracy, new democracy, and mixed government. But he did not combine them in the same way as Dickinson. In fact, his positions on many other
issues were almost diametrically opposed to Dickinson’s, showing that one could favor elements of all three systems in very different combinations.
Unlike Dickinson, Ellsworth opposed restricting the
vote to freeholders. Some of his
arguments were simply on the grounds of expediency, such as that people who
could vote for state legislatures would resist being denied the vote in federal
elections, and that the states were the best judges, but he went further than
anyone else on arguing against restrictions on the merits, “Ought not every man
who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy & dispose of
his money?” He
also favored a one-year term for the House, not so much on the merits as
because, “The people were fond of frequent elections and might safely be indulged
in one branch of the legislature.” Thus Ellsworth favored one old and one new
democratic principle for the House, but he opposed one of each as well – he
opposed enlarging the house, saying that thought most state legislatures were too
large and he apparently favored representation by wealth, moving to have representation by all free population and three-fifths of the
slaves “until some other rule that shall more accurately ascertain the wealth
of the several States can be devised.” On the other hand, he immediately afterward
withdrew his motion and seconded a motion for representation by population with
periodic reapportionment, since wealth was impractical to measure.
On the old democratic side, he apparently favored making legislators ineligible to executive office. Against old democracy, he did not
regard giving the House sole authority to initiate money bills as of any
importance.
And his views on qualifications to office are decidedly confusing. He preferred giving Congress the power to set
property qualifications for members to having property qualifications set in
the Constitution, saying that it would be too difficult to have find a uniform
qualification for all states. Such as
power was “not unexceptionable,” but not dangerous. Allowing Congress to set qualifications for
voters would be more dangerous. He opposed requiring fourteen years’
citizenship for Senators, favored requiring one year residency in the state represented and opposed disqualifying public debtors from office.*
because the large states would always win. He definitely showed some of an old democrat’s distrust of the executive. He considered a veto, even qualified veto by a single executive dangerous and favored joining the judges to the veto to give greater “wisdom & firmness.” He also favored having the Senate, rather than the executive, appoint judges since they would be less “open to caresses & intrigues.” Merely allowing the Senate to reject executive appointments would give the executive the effective power of appointment. He also favored a council for the President, to consist of the President of the Senate, Chief Justice, and head of the departments of finance, war, foreign affairs, domestic affairs and marine, to advise but not conclude him.
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*That last view, however, may be not so much a new democratic view as the general view of the commercial elite. All importing merchants were public debtors because they imported merchandise in too large a volume to pay the import taxes all at once. They would therefore pay a portion of the tax and sign a pledge promising to pay the balance as they sold the goods.
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