Some of the delegates showed considerable openness to both old and new democracy. Significantly, these especially included Virginians, who were particularly devoted to the new democratic principles of admitting Western states on an equal basis and regular reapportionment to match shifts in population.
Edmund Randolph favored popular election of
the House of Representatives, partly because only by making them popularly
elected could they be trusted with increased power, and partly because having
them elected by state legislatures reduced them to mere ambassadors with no
will of their own. As
seen before, he also wanted representation to be proportional to population and
firmly resisted giving each state equal representation in the Senate. He was the foremost advocate of requiring
regular reapportionment of the House to match shifts in population, perhaps
because he was conscious of the injustice of his native Virginia’s system of
representation by counties. It was
Randolph who first proposed requiring reapportionment to be regulated by a
periodic census instead of leaving it to the discretion of the nation legislature,
originally proposing to require reapportionment by population and wealth, but then changing to agree the rule of representation
to all free inhabitants and three-fifths of all slaves. He favored requiring periodic reapportionment
for the same reason that he opposed equality in the Senate:
If equality between great & small States be inadmissible, because in that case unequal numbers of Constituents wd be represented by equal number of votes; was it not equally inadmissible that a larger & more populous district of America should hereafter have less representation, than a smaller & less populous district. If a fair representation of the people be not secured, the injustice of the Gov’t will shake to its foundations.
Reapportionment could not be left
to the discretion of the legislature, or they would always be looking for
excuses to postpone alterations to keep power in the hands of those who
possessed it. Setting a
strict rule of reapportionment was also the best way to prevent new states from
using some other crisis to force a reapportionment. He also opposed allowing reapportionment by
wealth instead of population (with the three-fifths rule) for fear the
legislature would set a rule of wealth that would serve the advantage of the
people who controlled the legislature. Randolph also wanted to admit the western
states on an equal basis, saying that Congress had pledged faith to admit them on an equal basis, and they neither will nor should accept
any other. Randolph
was also generally open to immigrants holding office, favoring seven or at most
nine years citizenship rather than fourteen years for membership in the Senate and four, rather than seven, years’ citizenship to serve
in the House. A longer
term of citizenship would violate the government’s faith to immigrants.
Randolph favored many old
democratic principles as well. He
considered giving the House sole authority to originate money bills important
enough to make it a condition of giving each state equal representation in the
Senate. If the Senate were to be
proportional to population, he said, he would not insist on this condition, but
giving the House sole authority to originate money bills was a condition of
giving states equal representation in the Senate. Besides, the plan would be more acceptable to
the people if the “aristocratic” Senate were denied the power of the purse. He would also deny the
Senate authority to alter or amend money bills.
In response to objections that many economic regulations also involved
money, he proposed to give the House sole authority to originate money bills for
the purpose of raising revenue. He believed the people would see the Senate
as an aristocracy and the President as little less than a monarch and therefore
take alarm if anyone except their immediate representative could originate
money bills. The Senate was also more likely to be corrupt or unduly influenced
by the executive.
He also wanted to make legislators ineligible to non-military office,
for fear of corruption or influence and seconded a motion to preface federal authority to regulate the militia with the
words, “And, that the liberties of the people may be better secured against the
danger of standing armies in time of peace.”
He favored election of the
executive by the legislature and particularly thought it dangerously "aristocratic" to allow the Senate to break deadlocks in the Electoral College. Randolph also had an old democrat’s distrust of the executive. He originally even wanted a three-man
executive, considering a single executive as an embryonic monarchy (the
“foetus” of a monarchy were his words. He believed the people were adverse to the
very semblance of a monarchy and would never give a single executive their
confidence, and that “felt an opposition to it that he believed he should
continue to feel as long as he lived.” In fact, he appears to have gotten past his
opposition to a single executive and even to have supported an executive veto as
preventing large states from combining against the small ones. Although he favored election of
the executive by the legislature, Randolph believed that the executive should
be eligible for only one term to ensure his independence and particularly to
ensure that he would be firm enough to use his veto. He even favored allowing the President to
veto “every order, resolution or vote” to prevent evading his veto. On the other hand, he originally favored appointment of judges by the Senate instead of the executive (later changing his mind to favor appointment by the executive with the
advice and consent of the Senate) and opposed allowing the
President to pardon treason.
Edmund Randolph’s main rejection of
old democracy was in his not sharing the New England fetish with very frequent
elections; his main rejection of democracy in general was his view of the
Senate. He was ambivalent about the term
of the House, ultimately coming out in favor of a two-year term. Annual elections were “a source of mischief”
in the states, but only because there were not enough other restraints on
popular intemperance. His only reason
ultimately for favoring a longer term was one-year terms were inconvenient in
so large a country.
His feelings about the Senate were less mixed. He favored a seven-year term:
The democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this 2nd branch is to control the democratic branch of the Nat’l Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles had scarcely been able to stem the popular torrent.
He also believed that the Senate should be much smaller than the House to protect it from the “passionate proceedings to which
numerous assemblies are liable” and check the “turbulence and follies of
democracy.” Nor did he
see any danger in having state executives appoint temporary replacements if a
Senate seat unexpectedly fell vacant. He did oppose Gouverneur Morris’ proposal
for a Senate for life appointed by the executive, saying that it could never
co-exist with a popular branch.
In the end, as stated before,
Randolph refused to sign the Constitution, saying that offering the
Constitution on an all-or-nothing basis would be too controversial and might
lead to “confusion” and “anarchy & civil convulsions.” The reasons* Randolph gave for
opposing the Constitution were:
(1) The
Senate as a court for trying impeachment of the executive
(2) The
smallness of the House of Representatives
(3) The
lack of limitation on a standing army
(4) The
vague authorization of Congress to make “necessary and proper” laws
(5) The
authority of Congress to pass navigation acts by a simple majority
(6) The
authority of the federal government to intervene in state rebellions upon the
application of the state executive as well as the legislature
(7) The
need for a more definite boundary between the general and state legislatures
and judiciaries
(8) The
unqualified power of the President to pardon treason
(9) Congress’s
power to set its own pay.
Many of the objections, particularly the
smallness of the House, the lack of limitations on standing army, and the
President’s unlimited authority to pardon treason are old democratic
objections. Some are objections to the
extent of federal power and some are southern (particularly Virginian). None are new democratic.
Finally, it should be noted that although Randolph refused to sign the Constitution, he later reversed himself again and came out in favor of it at the Virginia ratifying convention.
Finally, it should be noted that although Randolph refused to sign the Constitution, he later reversed himself again and came out in favor of it at the Virginia ratifying convention.
*He also
listed as reasons the authority of Congress to tax exports and the need for a ¾
majority to override executive vetoes when he would have preferred 2/3. These two objectionable provisions were
changed.
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