Extreme State Sovereignty: Luther Martin

Once the New York delegation went home and the Great Compromise was reached, Luther Martin of Maryland remained the lonely voice arguing in vain for state sovereignty, ignored by all the others.  He arrived on June 9, 1787, after the Virginia Plan had been debated for some time, but before the New Jersey Plan had been presented, and Madison believed that he participated in preparing the New Jersey Plan.  He did not speak in favor of the New Jersey Plan when it was first introduced, but once the Virginia Plan was adopted, he backed Lansing’s last-ditch motion to revive the New Jersey Plan by vesting all powers of the United States legislature in “Congress.” 

At the separation from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into one: to these they look up for the security of their lives, liberties & properties: to these they must look up.  The federal Gov’t they formed, to defend the whole agst foreign nations, in case of war, and to defend the lesser States agst the ambition of the larger: they are afraid of granting powers unnecessarily, lest they should defeat the original end of the Union; lest the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States which the Union was meant to support; and expose the lesser to being swallowed up by the larger.

He also spoke against representation by population, against election by the people and against having two houses, all as weakening the sovereignty of states.  

His most extensive argument for state sovereignty took place on June 27-28, when he held forth on the subject at length.  The General Government, he said was meant merely to preserve the state governments, not to govern individuals (this is the clearest rejection anyone gave of the “national” principle of authority over individuals and in favor of the “federal” principle of legislating only for collective bodies).  If the central government was too weak, more powers could be added; if too powerful, powers could not be taken back.  (He has a point there).  He then went into more Lockean theory of the social contract than the other delegates ever used.  Just as individuals are equally free and independent in the state of nature, so are states equally free and independent in the state of nature, citing important social philosophers to prove his point.  Since the individual citizens of the states had formed their social contract to form state government, and since state governments had formed a social contract to create a federal government, to appeal directly to the people of the states to make a national government would throw them back into the state of nature (i.e., anarchy).  If representation became proportional to population, Virginia would have 16 representatives, and surely it would be easier for these 16 to combine against the small states than for the small states to combine against Virginia.  He feared representation by population would totally subordinate the other ten states to Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.  Reading Madison’s summary of this speech, with one argument against a national system piled on after another, one senses a note of panic there, a fear that state sovereignty was slipping away and that if he did not persuade the Convention now, all would be lost.  His colleagues sitting through the nearly two days of his speech may have gotten a different impression.  To them, the whole thing may simply have been long-winded and boring.

He kept up the argument.  Under the Articles of Confederation, the states were said to be equally sovereign and independent.  Why was that not now understood?  He would never agree to confederate except on “just” principles, i.e., equal representation by states.  Unlike Lansing and Yates, Martin did not walk out, but neither did he ever accept the new system.  When Morris and King proposed equal representation in the Senate so long as voting was by individuals instead of states, everyone else joined the general love-fest, but Martin resisted, saying that voting per capita departed from the idea of states being represented in the second branch.

Martin consistently supported state sovereignty on all issues but one.  He opposed having state officials take an oath to uphold federal laws lest it conflict with their oath to state laws.  He also opposed allowing the federal government to collect taxes from individuals directly; rather, when direct taxes were needed, it should have states raise them by quotas and favored having the states pay the Senate, since the Senate was to represent the states.  He opposed the creation of federal trial courts and, if they could not be prevented, wanted judges to be appointed by the Senate, as representatives of the states.  He opposed federal control of the state militia, favored a limit on the size of army the federal government could keep during peace time, and believed the consent of a state should be required before the federal government could intervene to suppress a rebellion.  Naturally, he thought a federal veto of state laws “improper and inadmissible”, although even he agreed to a strongly-worded statement federal law should be supreme, anything in state law notwithstanding.  He favored ratification of the Constitution by state legislatures, saying that an appeal to the people would lead to “commotions” and called for a unanimous ratification by all 13 states.  In any case, he was sure that the Constitution would be rejected, especially by the people and state government of Maryland, and that the only way it could ever pass would be if the people were rushed into it without proper chance to consider.

On one issue and one issue only did Martin support the central government over the states – the issue of western lands.  Maryland had no claims to western lands, and greatly resented the states (particularly Virginia) that did.  On this, Martin spoke more as a representative specifically of Maryland than as a states' rights man.  He opposed the provision that states could not be deprived of land without their consent – the western lands must be given up to the general government, a very important point to Maryland.  He mocked the large states’ resistance on the subject:

He wished Mr Wilson had thought a little sooner of the value of political bodies.  In the beginning, when the rights of the small sates were in question, they were phantoms, ideal beings.  Now when the great States were to be affected, political societies were of a sacred nature. 

Yet Martin undermined his own position in arguing for large states to give up their western claims.  In response to Wilson, who said that a state should be broken up only if the majority of people within the state wish to be divided, he replied that in Virginia, representation was by counties instead of by population. 

Even if they [the people wishing to separate] should become the majority, the majority of Counties, as in Virginia, may still hold fast the dominion over them.  Again, the majority may place the seat of Government entirely among themselves & for their own conveniency, and still keep the injured parts of the States in subjection, under the guaranty of the Gen’l Government agst domestic violence.(Ibid).

Martin does not seem to have realized what a strong argument this could have been against representation by states, as well as by counties!

One final comment on Martin and his irreconcilability.  He had left by the end of the Convention, and so did not have the opportunity to refuse to sign the Constitution, but he opposed it bitterly during the ratification debates in Maryland.  His opposition, as mentioned above, was in vain; the Maryland convention passed the Constitution 63-11 with only five days’ debate.  He would seen a natural follower of Thomas Jefferson, who after the Constitution was adopted led the party seeking to limit federal powers.  Yet Martin developed so deep a personal grudge against Jefferson that he ultimately joined Hamilton’s centralizing Federalists out of pure spite!

NEXT UP:  NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

Extreme State Sovereignty: The New York Delegation

These were the few irreconcilables who held out to the last for a mere strengthening of the Articles of Confederation and never agreed to the Constitution, even after the Great Compromise was reached.  There were only three of these; Robert Yates and John Lansing of New York and Luther Martin of Maryland.[1]  Why were these three so irreconcilable?  Maryland and New York were both on the large end of the medium sized states, and both had major ports, which meant they stood to lose a source of revenue under a more centralized system.  Upstate New York, in particular, was able to keep land taxes low by taxing foreign trade from Connecticut and New Jersey that went through New York City and was reluctant to give up the privilege.  Maryland, on the other hand, had no claims to western land and wanted Virginia and other states with such claims to give them up.  During the ratification debates, there was little controversy in Maryland, and its convention ratified the Constitution 63-11.  (Martin strongly opposed it).  In New York, on the other hand, the Constitution was hotly controversial, and the state convention ended up ratifying only when it became clear that ten other states had ratified already and that New York was in danger of being left out of the United States altogether.  Indeed, the Federalist Papers were written in an attempt to sway New Yorkers in favor of the Constitution when it was a hotly contested issue.

Of these three, little needs to be said about Robert Yates.  He does not appear to have participated in debate at all, but he voted together with Lansing and against Hamilton (also of New York), and he walked out of the Convention at the same time as Lansing.

John Lansing (New York):  New York’s delegation participated in the Convention up through July 10, 1787 and was absent the next day, never to return.  Hamilton had already left after June 29, despairing of building strong enough government.  Lansing and Yates together consistently voted for state sovereignty and against the Virginia Plan.  By July 10, 1787, it was apparent that the Virginia Plan would be adopted and that representation would be by population in the lower house.  The debate by then was solely over equality in the Senate.  It was at this point that Lansing and Yates walked out, convinced that their influence was at an end.  They never came back.  Hamilton returned August 13 and took part in the debates, but New York remained without a vote because a single delegate was not allowed to represent an entire state.  Hamilton was the only representative from New York to sign the Constitution. 

John Lansing probably played a role in drafting the New Jersey Plan and, not too surprisingly, he supported it when it was introduced.  The Virginia Plan, he argued destroys the sovereignty of the states and absorbs all power except for “little local matters,” whereas the New Jersey Plan preserves state sovereignty and laws.  He also argued that the Convention did not have authority to propose an entire new system of government, and the people and states would never agree to it, especially to giving the general government a veto over all state laws.  Even after the Virginia Plan was adopted, Lansing made a last-ditch motion to vest all powers in “Congress,” i.e., the old Continental Congress, making much the same arguments as before.  He particularly objected to the federal veto of state laws, saying that it would burden Congress with an unbearable amount of work and involve people in the veto who had no knowledge of conditions in the states whose laws the were vetoing.  Not too surprisingly, he wanted to keep equal representation by states, since states would never voluntarily part with their sovereignty and saw little use in even sending the issue of representation to committee (the committee that proposed the Great Compromise).  Not long afterward, he returned to New York, and his participation was at an end.

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[1] John Francis Mercer of Maryland might also fit into this category.  He was a member of the Convention who opposed the Constitution during ratification debates and favored state sovereignty, but he arrived late and left early and therefore did not have much chance to make his opinion known on the subject.

Other Moderate Advocates of State Sovereignty

David Brearly

Others in this category included David Brearley and Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey and no doubt others who did not speak up.  As commented before, Charles Pinckney was not impressed with their arguments.  “[T]he whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Nat’l system.”  Pinckney turned out to be right, as did Madison in his arguments that small states benefited most from strong central government because it would protect them from large states.  Once the Great Compromise was reached, Paterson and his followers dropped all resistance.  The hot-headed Bedford not only signed the Constitution, but proposed to expand Congress’s powers to all cases “in which the harmony of the U. States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation,” which even Edmund Randolph thought was going to far.  Paterson argued against a more centralized government by pointing out that the small states of New Jersey and Maryland had been the ones that most resisted the Articles of Confederation, but he undermined his own case by acknowledging that they resisted the Articles not because the central government under them was too powerful but because it was not powerful enough – New Jersey (lacking a major port) wanted to give Congress authority over foreign trade and Maryland wanted federal control of the western land.

John Langdon

John Langdon of New Hampshire is particularly revealing in this regard.  New Hampshire was absent during the fierce debate over representation, indeed, at one point the small state representatives; indeed, as the deadlock grew, small state delegates moved to contact New Hampshire and call for a delegation, which they expected to be an ally.  As it turned out, the New Hampshire delegation arrived on the very day the Convention settled on having two Senators for each state, and after that New Hampshire consistently voted to increase federal power.  Langdon favored a Congressional veto of state laws, federal authority over state militias, payment of the national legislature from the federal treasury,  and authorizing federal intervention in state rebellions without the invitation of the state legislature.  

The final proof, however, that Pinckney and Madison were right, was during the ratification debates in the states after the Constitution was presented.  Although Delaware and New Jersey offered the most resistance to the increase in federal authority in Convention, their state conventions were the first and third, respectively to ratify the Constitution, and both conventions ratified unanimously with little debate.  Connecticut, which consistently resisted increasing federal power in the Convention was fifth to ratify, and with very little controversy or resistance.  In the end, small states felt less threatened by a stronger central government than by their larger and more powerful neighbors.

Moderate Advocates of State Sovereignty

These were the advocates of the New Jersey Plan, who originally resisted the Virginia Plan even if given equality in the Senate, but dropped all resistance and supported the Constitution once the Great Compromise was reached.  On the whole, they played a less distinguished role than the moderates or compromisers.

William Paterson of New Jersey introduced the New Jersey Plan and was by for the most important member of this group.  Even before introducing the New Jersey Plan, he led a strong counter-attack against the Virginia Plan, particularly in establishing a government over individuals instead of states and representing states by population.  The Convention, he said, was merely authorized to strengthen the Articles of Confederation, not to establish a whole new government, and even if they had the authority, the people would never accept it.  There was no need for a national government (over individuals), merely a confederacy (of states).  “A confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members composing it & sovereignty supposed equality.”  He considered making representation proportional to population to be as unjust as giving a rich man greater votes in proportion to his greater stake in society.  Such a system would give the rich total domination and be unsafe for others; likewise, giving proportional representation to states would give all power to the three large states and be unsafe for the other states.  He also opposed having representatives elected by the people instead of state legislatures as unduly weakening the influence of states.  All that was needed, he said, was “to mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and provide for the use of coertion (sic.), which was the great point.”  He concluded with a challenge – let large states withdraw from the United States if  they chose, the small states would never agree to a plan that threatened to swallow them up.  “He had rather submit to a monarch, to a depot, than to such a fate.  He would not only oppose the plan here but on his return home to every thing in his power to defeat it there.”  

The New Jersey Plan was drawn up in a caucus of delegates from the states of Connecticut, New York (except for Hamilton, of course), New Jersey and Delaware, together with Luther Martin of Maryland, but it was William Paterson who introduced the plan and was most strongly associated with it.  Again, he argued that the Convention lacked authority to establish a new government and that the people would never agree to it.  He described the Articles of Confederation as a “treaty” among equal sovereigns, and in order to maintain their sovereignty, states must each have an equal vote and their representatives must be chosen by state legislatures instead of by the people.  He added that even if it was unjust for large states to agree to giving each state an equal vote, it had been done and could not be taken back.  The large states joined the confederacy eagerly; resistance came from the small states of New Jersey and Maryland.  Nor did he agree with the Virginians that his plan of allowing coercion would harm small states; there was no reason why coercion should be used against states instead of individuals.  Paterson served on the committee that proposed the Great Compromise, but did not agree with large state representatives that some other concession should be made in exchange for equality in the Senate; agreeing to proportional representation in the House was a considerable concession, and he would opposed the Compromise as giving too much by small states.  On July 16, 1787, the date of the final deadlock and breakthrough, when Edmund Randolph proposed adjournment, Paterson agreed and proposed that they break up the Convention and go home to their constituents.  When Randolph said he only meant adjournment for the day, Paterson agreed, “as an opportunity seemed to be wished by the larger States to deliberate further on conciliatory expedients.”  

Like other small state representatives, Paterson was more of a nationalist than large state representatives on one issue – the breakup of large states.  He proposed that if we were to become a single nation, the states must be thrown into the “hotchpot” and redivided to make them equal and challenged Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania to see if they would agree to it.  This was probably more an attempt to discourage large states from seeking greater centralization by warning them of the consequences that a serious proposal.

Gunning Bedford (Delaware):  Gunning Bedford’s role was much smaller than Paterson’s, but he made a few remarks worth noting.  He spoke against a Congressional veto of state laws, fearing that it would be dominated by large states.  Besides, the veto would swamp Congress with state laws to consider, create undue delay in states, and subject their laws to people who knew nothing about the local conditions under which laws were made.  He argued that there was no middle ground between complete consolidation and a mere confederation of states.  The large states hoped to dominate the system and the Deep Southern states supported them because they hoped to become large.  He went on to make a very rash remark, “The Large States dare not dissolve the Confederation.  If they do, the small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them justice.” Having made this threat, he then hastened to assure everyone that he was not threatening, but the damage had been done.  Rufus King, Edmund Randolph, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris all roundly condemned the remark (sometimes in terms hot enough that some of their passion comes through Madison's otherwise rather sterile notes) and Paterson dissociated himself from it, although he said that Gouverneur Morris’ comments about the sword and gallows also deserved to be condemned.  Bedford apologized saying this was merely a prediction, not a threat, and was partly provoked by Morris’ comments about the sword uniting and Gorham suggesting that small states allow themselves to be annexed by large ones.  Once the Great Compromise was reached, Bedford largely dropped his opposition to a stronger central government, going so far as to propose to give Congress power to legislate "in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent," or in which the harmony of the U. States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation."  Moderate nationalist Edmund Randolph thought this was going too far.

Connecticut Compromisers: Roger Sherman and William Samuel Johnson

The other two significant compromisers were also from Connecticut -- Roger Sherman and William Samuel Johnson.

Roger Sherman

Roger Sherman appears to have originally favored a mere strengthening of the Articles of Confederation.  His first comment was that the Continental Congress needed more power, but making too great inroads in the system would just lead to rejection.  He regarded the general government’s only objects to be foreign and military affairs, foreign trade and resolving internal disputes, with all other matters in the hands of the states.  The day after the Virginia Plan had been adopted, Sherman seconded a motion to vest all federal powers in “Congress,” i.e., the old Continental Congress.  He ideally favored a unicameral legislature and saw no need to add “another” branch elected by the people to Congress; such a branch would merely get in the way.  He saw no reason for the election of representatives by the people unless states were to be abolished altogether.  States must participate in the central government to preserve harmony between them. 

Yet Sherman was apparently the second delegate after Dickinson to propose the Great Compromise.  On June 11, 1787, he proposed that suffrage in the first branch be according to the number of free inhabitants and each state have one vote in the second house.  Everything depended on the equal vote in the second house, or the small states would never agree to the system.  Again, even as he argued for keeping the old Continental Congress, Sherman also proposed the Great Compromise as an alternative.  Although he did not believe that the large states had been harmed by the equality of voting by states under the Articles, he would agree to proportionality in one house and voting by states in the other “[i]f the difficulty on the subject of representation could not be got over.”  Once the Great Compromise was suggested, Sherman became one of its strongest advocates.  He compared giving more votes to large states in proportion to their population to giving a rich man more votes in proportion to his greater stake in society; there would be no protection for the lesser members.  He also argued that giving each state an equal voice in the Senate would give government more “vigor” because small states were more vigorous than large ones. Equality in the Senate would require all measures passed to have the support of a majority of the states as well as of the people.  He further suggested that giving states equal representation in the Senate was necessary to ensure the survival of states, although he was willing to have voting in the Senate be by individuals instead of by states.

 Like Ellsworth, Sherman was generally skeptical of the power of the federal government even after the Great Compromise was adopted.  He proposed to give the national legislature authority to make laws “in all cases which may concern the common interests of the Union” but not to interfere in states’ internal affairs, and particularly not be able to tax individuals directly, preferred whenever possible to try federal cases in state courts, distrusted federal authority over bankruptcy, and opposed federal authority to cut canals on the grounds that to do so would tax to whole to benefit only a local area.  On the other hand, he disagreed with Morris, Pinckney and King who said that it was not necessary for the national legislature to meet every year; he believed there would be business enough to require “frequent” meetings.  This may have been driven more by Sherman's distrust of the executive than anything else.  He opposed a federal veto of state laws, saying that a state law contrary to federal law would necessarily be invalid and that the courts’ authority to strike down such laws was sufficient.  He maintained that states could not be dismembered without their consent.  With regard to state militias, he would allow the federal government to establish a uniform rule for all state militias, but leave the actual training and discipline to the states, saying that just as states retained concurrent tax power, they should have concurrent power of military defense and law enforcement.  And he strongly opposed federal appointment of generals with the sarcastic remark that, “[I]f the people should be so far asleep as to allow the most influential officer of the militia to be appointed by the Gen’l Government, every man of discernment  would rouse them by sounding the alarm to them.”

 When the issue of ratification was first discussed, Sherman favored ratification by state legislature instead of conventions, an indication that he saw the new system as based on states rather than individuals.  He favored requiring unanimous ratification by all the states, as a continuation of the old system.  When the Convention refused to require unanimity, he proposed requiring the consent of ten states.  Alternately, he was willing to agree to ratification by nine states (the number eventually agreed on), if the old Continental Congress first approved the new Constitution.  He believed that amendments to the Constitution should require the approval of “the several state,” i.e., apparently, unanimous consent of the states.  When the Convention decided on approval by three-fourths of the states instead, he proposed a qualification that no state could be affected in its internal police or deprived of equality in the Senate.*

William Samuel Johnson

William Samuel Johnson played a much smaller role in the Convention than either Ellsworth or Sherman, but he deserves to be mentioned anyhow because he brilliantly expressed the spirit of the Connecticut Compromise.  As the Virginia and New Jersey plans were being debated, he said that supporters of the New Jersey Plan feared that the Virginia Plan would destroy states altogether.  Since Wilson and the Virginians denied that this was their intention, “If this could be shewn in such a manner as to satisfy the patron of the N. Jersey propositions, many of their objections would no doubt be removed.”  After the Virginia Plan was adopted, Johnson argued for equality in the Senate, saying:

On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in others a district of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed, ought to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other the States. 

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*"Internal police" is an 18th century expression, probably best "translated" as internal policy.  This provision was not adopted, but the guarantee of equal representation in the Senate was adopted, and remains the only unamendable portion of the Constitution.

Connecticut Compromisers: Oliver Ellsworth

Since the Great Compromise is also called the Connecticut Compromise, and since Connecticut to this day calls itself the Constitution State because of its critical role in negotiating that compromise, what about the Connecticut delegates?   The Connecticut delegation showed a certain ambivalence on the subject.   When the New Jersey Plan was first introduced, Oliver Ellsworth moved to retain the legislative power in “Congress,” i.e., the old Continental Congress under the Articles, which would have meant that he supported the New Jersey Plan.  Three days later, a vote was taken which plan to adopt and Connecticut broke ranks with the small states and supported the Virginia Plan, effectively dooming the New Jersey Plan.  Yet the very next day Roger Sherman (another Connecticut delegate) was seconding and Connecticut supporting yet another motion to vest all powers in “Congress,” which sounded very much like backsliding to the New Jersey Plan.  At this point, the New Jersey Plan was taken off the table and Connecticut could begin its role in establishing the Connecticut Compromise.

 Ellsworth began by proposing to drop the inflammatory word “national” from the Virginia Plan and simply say “of the United States.”  When the issue of representation in the lower house came up, Connecticut voted to keep representation by states, but when the proposal was defeated, Ellsworth said he was not sorry on the whole.  He proposed conceding proportional representation in the lower house as a ground for compromise with regard to the upper house, which would have representation by states.  

We are partly national; partly federal.  The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable to the national principle & would secure the large States agst the small.  An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle  & would secure the Small States agst the large. 

The New England states other than Massachusetts might split from the U.S. if not given an equal voice.  The large states’ size alone would give them greater weight despite equality in the Senate; the small states needed equal representation in the Senate to protect themselves.  It would be easier for large states to combine against small ones than vice versa.  Although he favored a stronger government, he warned against attempting too much lest all be lost.  Ellsworth argued that equal representation in the Senate would not unjustly allow the minority to thwart the will of the majority; the minority needed to protect itself from the might of the majority, just as the House of Lords in England protected its own special interest from the majority.  He also appealed to the states’ good faith under the Articles of Confederation to allow all states an equal voice.  

Ellsworth was thus a leading advocate of the Great Compromise.  When Morris and King proposed the final form of that compromise, that each state have an equal number of Senators, but that they vote as individuals instead of by states, Ellsworth made the conciliatory remark that he had always approved of voting in that mode.

Unlike Dickinson and Franklin, Ellsworth was not generally a nationalist by inclination, and even after the Great Compromise was reached, Connecticut remained one of the most skeptical states about increasing federal power.  He wanted the national legislature to have only a few great, national objects and believed that a federal veto of all states laws would be so slow and awkward that it would require federally appointed state governors.*  He opposed allowing federal intervention in state rebellions without an invitation from the state, although he would allow the state executive to make the invitation if the legislature were unable to meet He also opposed giving the general government authority to make rules for the militia unless in actual federal service or if states neglected their militias, saying that without their militias states would “pine away to nothing.”  Giving the general government over a part of the militia would merely weaken the rest of it, and the people of different states would never submit to the same discipline.  Alternately, he would allow a common rule of discipline, so long as the states were the ones to actually carry it out.  His views on pay for the national legislature changed over time.  At first he favored pay by states, since the general scale of pay was different in different states.  He later proposed having at least the Senate paid by the states so they would have confidence in the Senate.  In the end, however, he decided that payment by the states would make Congress too dependent on them and that legislators should be paid from the national treasury.  Finally, he believed that ratification should be by state legislatures instead of by conventions.  He granted that if any state legislature considered itself incompetent to ratify the Constitution, it could call a convention instead, but he did not trust conventions.  If legislatures were competent to ratify the Articles of Confederation and all subsequent changes to it, why not the Constitution, which he regarded as a compact among states.

            Oliver Ellsworth had gone home by the end of the convention and so was not present to sign.  However, he was one of the strongest supporters of ratification and wrote a series of articles under the pseudonym of Landholder that were considered some of the best arguments in favor of the Constitution.

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*It was in response to this comment that Charles Pinckney said he did think state executives should be federally appointed,

The Most Famous Compromiser: Benjamin Franklin

Benjamin Franklin was, no doubt, the most cosmopolitan member of the Convention, the first American of international renown, a member of the Royal Society, many colonies’ former agent in England and the former U.S. minister to France, where he played a critical role in treaty negotiations and mingled with the top literatti (in England as well).  Franklin had been urging the colonies to “Join or Die” since the 1750’s, so he would seem a natural nationalist, who would urge his fellow delegates to look beyond their local interests to the good of the whole.  And no doubt this was his natural inclination, but instead his statesmanship took the form of resisting that natural inclination and working, instead, to reassure the small states and reach the compromise that save the Constitution.

 He indicated his natural inclination, saying he would prefer to see each representative consider himself a representative of the whole rather than an agent for a particular state, and it would not matter how representation was apportioned.  Since this was not realistic, he favored representation in proportion to population and voting as individuals, rather than by states.  He did not see this as threatening to swallow up the small states any more than Scotland was swallowed up by a union with England.  In the interest of equalizing states, he even offered to give up a part of Pennsylvania to Delaware and New Jersey, but, he said, this would not be a good long-term solution since populations are constantly shifting, which would require state boundaries to be constantly shifting as well to maintain equality.

As a compromise, he proposed for the smallest state to volunteer to provide whatever quota of money or force it could afford and have all others agree to furnish an equal portion.  Congress would then consisted of an equal number of representatives from each states, who would vote as individuals, rather than by states.  If more supplies were required, Congress could make up the difference by requesting voluntary contributions from the larger and more powerful states, which he believed they would be willing to furnish.  He apparently considered equal representation by states as just so long as each state was financing the system equally.  What he considered most unjust was the system of voting by states.  Under that system, the majority of each state’s delegation, in effect, cast that state’s vote.  Since larger states generally had larger delegations than small ones, it would be possible for a measure favored by a bare majority of the seven smaller states’ delegations to pass, even though unanimously opposed by all the large states, and a distinct minority of members of the legislature could prevail over the majority.

This proposal was made when the Convention was debating whether representation would be by population or by states in either house, or even whether to have two houses at all.  Later, when it became apparent that there would be two houses and that the lower house would be proportional to population, he proposed a similar system for the Senate:

If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger.  If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger.  When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of the plank do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. 

He proposed instead to have an equal number of representatives per state in the Senate, each voting as individuals.  In all matter involving the sovereignty of individual states or the overall powers of the central government, each state would have and equal vote.  In all matters related to spending, states would have a vote in proportion to their contribution to the treasury.  In fact, however, the large states never said anything to indicate that they were resisting equality in the Senate for fear that it would tax then excessively; their arguments were based on the principle that every person should be equally represented and the practical argument that unless representation was in proportion to a state’s actual importance, the government would be hopelessly weak.

Franklin served on the committee that first proposed the Great Compromise, to have states equally represented in the Senate in exchange for giving the House sole authority to originate money bills.  This compromise was apparently his proposal,  and he made clear that he considered these two conditions dependent on each other and would not support them separately.  His main other contributions on centralization were to propose a federal authority to cut canals, and, at the end, to urge everyone to support the Constitution, despite having some doubts abouts it because a stronger government was clearly needed (9/17/87, pp. 653-654).  As the delegates proceeded to sign the Constitution, Benjamin Franklin gave the most famous statement of then Convention.  George Washington, presiding over the meeting, had been sitting in a chair with a sun painted on it:

Washington's Chair

I have, said he, often and often in the course of the Session, and the viscisitudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that behind the President without being able to tell whenter it was rising or setting; But now at length I have the hapiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting sun.

Compromisers, Including John Dickinson

This is, in many ways, the critical group, the ones who supported the Virginia Plan but favored giving each state equal representation in the Senate.  If the moderate nationalists were the most creative members of the Convention, the compromisers were the most statesmenlike.    The moderate nationalists made the original proposal that became the Constitution; the compromisers saved the convention from breaking down and made its success possible.   Overall, compromisers varied greatly in the amount of centralization they favored, ranging from ones who accepted the Virginia Plan only reluctantly, preferring the New Jersey Plan, to ones who only reluctantly agreed to equality in the Senate.  The one issue of centralization all but Benjamin Franklin agreed on was that they opposed states giving up control of their militias.

John Dickinson (Delaware).  The Great Compromise is also called the Connecticut Compromise because it was supported by the Connecticut delegation, but the honor of being first to propose it goes to John Dickinson of Delaware, and he proposed it, no less, on June 2, the end of the very first week of the Convention.  He argued on that date that it was essential to the stability of the country to preserve the states.  Furthermore, “He hoped each State would retain an equal voice in at least one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would be a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property.”  No one at the time paid much attention to the proposal.

Dickinson showed another extraordinary piece of insight very early in the convention when he proposed that the lower house be elected by the people directly and the upper house by the state legislature, the system ultimately adopted.  Nonetheless, Dickinson’s proposals went largely unheeded, as large state delegates resisted equality in the Senate and small states resisted the entire system.  When the small states proposed the New Jersey Plan, Dickinson told Madison, “You see the consequences of pushing things too far.  Some members from the small states whish for two branches in the General Legislature, and are friends to a good National Government; be we would sooner submit to a foreign power than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the legislature, and thereby thrown under the domination of the large States.”  (?).

Dickinson showed himself to be a nationalist in general, other than his support for equality in the Senate.  He firmly supported having the national legislature paid from the national treasury to keep it independent of the “prejudices, passions, and improper views” of state legislatures.  He even favored a Congressional veto of state laws, saying that it was impossible to draw a line between proper and improper use of the veto and either the national or state governments must be exposed to the risk of being injured by the other.  Like Madison, he thought there was greater danger of encroachment by the states.  He also favored establishing federal courts and opposed any guaranty of existing state borders.  Finally, he favored allowing the federal government to intervene in case of a rebellion in a state without the state’s request, or at least with only the request of the executive, rather than the legislature.